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NAZI INVASION OF FLORIDA!
by LEON O. PRIOR*
THE  UNITED  STATES  has been invaded only twice by enemymilitary forces since the War of 1812. Both invasions were
by small parties of German saboteurs during World War II.
On June 13, 1942, four men came ashore by boat from a sub-
marine at Amagansett, Long Island, New York. Four days
later, four other Germans landed along the isolated beach
some four miles south of Ponte Vedra, a luxurious resort on the
upper east coast of Florida near Jacksonville. These German
invasions were a part of the Abwehr’s Operation Pastorius. 1
In the summer of 1941 the entire Abwehr espionage system
in the United States had been destroyed by action of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and all of their principle agents had
been arrested in the famous “House on 92nd Street” case.
German espionage in the United States had been directed by
Frederick Joubert Duquesne. 2 Major General Erwin von La-
housen-Vivremont, head of Abwehr Abteilung II, noted in his
diary that the arrest of Duquesne’s network had been a severe
blow to the Fatherland’s plans for subversive activity in the
United States, and both he and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief
of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence, had been se-
verely rebuked by Hitler for their incompetency. 3 After Pearl
Harbor, Der Fuhrer demanded that an American sabotage pro-
gram be launched without delay, and Operation Pastorius was
the result. 4 American civil and military defense, although sus-
picious of German activity, had no warning or advance intelli-
gence that alerted them to the Atlantic coast sabotage operations.
* Mr. Prior is professor of history, Miami-Dade Junior College, North
Campus and a retired special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.
1. Named for Franz Daniel Pastorius, the first German immigrant to
America who landed in 1683.
2. The motion picture “House on 92nd Street” was subsequently based
on the investigation and arrest of the Duquesne network.
3. Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis, Hitler’s Spies and Saboteurs, Based
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It was assumed that alert wartime beach patrols would detect
and prevent any enemy landing or invasion. In those grim war
days, with the numerous sinkings of United States vessels by
German submarines, a constant patrol of the beaches was main-
tained by air, sea, jeep, and horseback.
The Florida and Long Island sabotage parties consisted of
four German marines each. Their primary objective was to
land with explosive and incendiary materials and to disperse
to various parts of the country. On July 4, the two groups
planned to rendezvous in a hotel in Cincinnati to coordinate
their sabotage operations. 5 Their secondary objective was to
carry out the Abwehr’s plan for Operation Pastorius. This was
a two-fold mission. The first aim was wholesale industrial sabo-
tage of aluminum and light metal plants, power plants, and
water and railroad facilities throughout the east. They planned
to destroy Aluminum Company of America plants in Tennessee,
East St. Louis, Illinois, and Massena, New York; Hell Gate
Bridge in New York City; Pennsylvania Railroad’s eastern
terminal in Newark, New Jersey; Horseshoe Curve of the
Pennsylvania Railroad near Altoona, Pennsylvania; New York
City’s water supply system; and the hydroelectric power plants
at Niagara Falls, New York.6 The second goal was to arouse
popular feeling against German-Americans through nuisance
and terror explosions in department stores and railroad and
bus terminals. It was hoped that antagonism against German-
Americans would bond this group into a fifth column move-
ment in the United States and at the same time the activity
would demoralize the American population and war effort. 7
All of the Germans selected to invade the United States had
lived and worked in this country, and they had returned to the
Fatherland shortly before the beginning of the war. The leader
of the Florida landing party was Edward John Kerling, a thirty-
three year old mechanic. Born at Weisbaden, Germany, in 1909,
he had joined the Nazi Party in 1928, the year before he came
to America. He worked in a Brooklyn packing plant, was chauf-
feur for a time for Ely Culbertson, the bridge expert, and then
secured employment with a New York oil company. He married
5. Alan Hynd, Passport to Treason (New York, 1943), 303.
6. Ibid., 301.
7 . George J. Dasch, Eight Spies Against America (New York, 1959), 73.
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a girl who worked as a maid, and he lived with her in New
York until 1939. He became very active in the German-American
Bund and visited Germany several times during the 1930s. In
1939, he purchased a yawl, the “Lekala” and he and Herman
Neubauer planned to sail it to Germany. However, the Coast
Guard seized the vessel when it became waterlogged near
Wilmington, North Carolina. The government accused the
owners of planning to furnish supplies to German submarines
operating in the area. Kerling managed to return to Germany
by way of Lisbon in July 1940, and he played an active role in
the Nazi party. He had always disliked Americans, believing
that they looked down on him. Now he embraced with en-
thusiasm the concept of a “super race” which included himself.
Herbert Hans Haupt was an American citizen through the
naturalization of his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Hans Max Haupt of
Chicago. They had brought him to the United States from
Stettin when he was five years old. He received his education in
the Chicago public schools where he had been an ROTC cadet.
His father was a loyal Nazi and young Haupt drilled with the
Bund. He was an apprentice optical worker until June 1941,
when he fled to Mexico to avoid marriage with his Chicago girl
friend after she became pregnant. The German consul there
provided him with funds and arranged his passage to Germany
by way of Japan. He was twenty-two when he “volunteered” for
the American sabotage mission. Werner Thiel was born at Dort-
mund, Germany, in 1907. He came to the United States at twenty
and secured employment at a hospital in Hammond, Indiana.
Later, he became a toolmaker in Detroit and worked at mis-
cellaneous jobs in Philadelphia and Los Angeles. While in De-
troit he was active in the German-American Bund and in the
Friends of New Germany. He returned to Germany in 1939 by
way of Japan and Siberia. Herman Neubauer, age thirty-two
and a native of Hamburg, entered the United States under the
immigration quota while employed as a seaman aboard the
S. S. Leviathan. Later he worked at hotels in Hartford and Chi-
cago. His Nazi sympathies drew him back to Germany in 1940.
Recruitment and training of the saboteurs was begun in the
spring of 1942 by Lieutenant Walter Kappe, a Nazi intelligence
officer who was working in collaboration with the Abwehr.
Kappe, a German-American, had been a reporter for several
3
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German language newspapers in New York and Cincinnati and
by the late 1930s was serving as New York press chief for the
German-American Bund. For something less than two months,
the men attended a sabotage school at Quentz Lake at Branden-
burg, forty miles west of Berlin. 8 It was a crash program and the
training was technical and diversified. The men learned how to
blow up bridges, railroad lines, electric power lines, and blast
furnaces, and to use various types of fuses, detonators, and in-
cendiary and explosive devices. 9 They studied American maga-
zines and newspapers, and brushed up on American slang and
song hits. Admiral Canaris, who was later to be hanged for his
part in the 1944 plot against Hitler, was never very convinced
about the skill of these men or the success of their training, and
he expressed skepticism about the whole mission. When, at the
end of their training course, he signed their orders, he was
quoted as saying, “This will cost these poor men their lives.”
Each man was given a cover identity which was supported
by a complete set of forged documents prepared by the Abwehr.
They included a passport, selective service card, ration coupons,
driver’s license, and other identifying data. The training was
completed on May 22, 1942, and the night before there was a
“graduation” celebration complete with music and wines in a
banquet room near the Tiergarten in Berlin. Lieutenant Kappe
and General Lahousen were present, but Admiral Canaris had
declined an invitation. Perhaps he was still fearful as to the
future of the program.
The men were moved from Germany to the great submarine
base at Lorient, France, but prior to sailing, they enjoyed a two
day stopover in Nazi-occupied Paris at a hotel on the Rue de
L’Opera. Young Haupt got into a midnight row with a street-
walker, and the fight ended in screams and curses. Georg
Johann Dasch, a member of the planned Long Island landing
party, openly told a barman of their mission, and he and his
friends ended a night of drinking in a free-for-all. The two
groups sailed four days apart. On May 26 Kerling and his men
boarded the U-584, and were soon plowing westward across the
Atlantic to Florida. They landed in the early dawn of June 17. 10
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This lonely beach area south of the Ponte Vedra resort had been
specially selected because i t  was believed to be sparsely
inhabited.
The saboteurs were rowed ashore in an inflatable rubber
boat by one of the submarine crew. A line was attached to the
craft so that it could be pulled back if the surf was too rough.
This was one of the critical points of the operation; the invaders
were now cut off from the Fatherland without even a shortwave
radio. The men were clad only in bathing suits, although they
also wore official German marine caps bearing the swastika and
a spread eagle insignia. This partial uniform was a precautionary
measure, or so the Nazis believed. If the landing was unsuccess-
ful and the men were captured, they planned to claim that they
were an enemy military invading force and would demand to be
treated as prisoners of war. Otherwise without any military
appearance, they knew their capture would mean trial  and
almost certain execution as foreign agents.
The saboteurs brought ashore four large wooden waterproof
boxes of explosives and incendiary and detonating devices; two
short-handled, military trench shovels; four American made suit-
cases containing United States-made clothing; forged identifica-
tion cards; a large amount of United States currency; and a
small rubber ball. The bulk of the currency, $70,000, plus $1,000
in small bills, was carried by Kerling in two money bags. The
other members of the party had money belts each containing
$5,000 in fifty dollar bills and $2,000 in small bills. 11
The landing was without incident or discovery. The Ger-
mans, still wearing their wet swim suits and their German mili-
tary caps, hauled their boxes up on the beach away from the
high tide line. Here in the sand dunes, near the ruins of an
abandoned house and about 200 feet east of Highway AIA,
they dug a large pit and buried the explosives. Then, some
thirty feet directly north, they buried their caps and shovels.
Later, when they were established in the United States, they
planned to return in automobiles and haul the gear away.
The men started walking north along the beach toward
Jacksonville Beach. They frolicked in the surf and played catch
with the rubber ball. Thus they hoped that if nearby residents
11. Dasch, Eight Spies Against America, 89.
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or a shore patrol happened to notice them, there would be
nothing about them to arouse suspicions. This was a public
beach, and it would appear, they thought, that they were just
four young men out for their morning exercise. It was one of the
Nazis’ many small touches, and as it turned out they were not
challenged and no one seems to have noticed anything unusual
about them or their appearance. When they reached Jackson-
ville Beach they slipped clothing on over their swim suits and
walked to the main highway where they boarded a bus into
Jacksonville. Apparently they aroused no suspicion here either
since neither the driver nor any of the bus passengers reported
them to civil authorities. 
Arriving in downtown Jacksonville, they enjoyed a large
American breakfast-one of the few benefits, as it turned out,
of their mission. Kerling, using the alias Edward J. Kelley,
registered for himself and Neubauer that afternoon at the
Seminole Hotel at the corner of Hogan and Forsyth streets.
The men were assigned to room 402. They both checked out
the following morning, June 18. The other Germans, Thiel and
Haupt, registered at the Mayflower Hotel, two blocks from the
Seminole, at Bay and Julia streets. Thiel only signed the register
at the Mayflower, giving his name as William Thomas of New
York City. They paid cash in advance for rooms 716 and 718,
and both checked out early the next morning. The hotel rec-
ords revealed that Thiel was charged for one telephone call to
room 402 at the Seminole Hotel. Subsequent interrogation of
the employees at the two hotels revealed that the saboteurs had
aroused no suspicions either by action or accent. 12
After leaving Jacksonville, Kerling and Thiel went to New
York where they were apprehended on June 24. Neubauer and
Haupt travelled to Chicago where they were taken into custody
by the F.B.I. on June 27. All arrests were made quietly and
secretly. The information leading to the identification and arrest
of the Florida saboteurs had developed through investigation
of the Amagansett landing party. The Long Island group had
landed on June 13, and thirty hours later, Dasch, the leader, was
calling the F.B.I.'s New York office. He identified himself as
Frank Daniel Pastorius of Germany, and said that he had im-
12. Alan Hynd, Passport to Treason, 294-95.
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portant information, but would have to get in touch with the
F.B.I. office in Washington. It sounded like a crank call, but it
was noted by the agent receiving it nevertheless. Dasch went
to Washington, and after checking into the Mayflower Hotel,
he called the F.B.I. and asked to be connected with J. Edgar
Hooer. That was not possible, but the F.B.I. men arranged a
meeting. Dasch convinced them of his identity when he dropped
the $80,000 supplied by the Abwehr in front of them. Dasch
alerted the F.B.I. to the planned landing in Florida and he
identified Kerling as the leader there. 13  The Florida invaders
were still at sea at that time.
Because of Dasch’s warning the four Florida invaders were
under almost constant surveillance by F.B.I. agents after they
arrived in Chicago and New York. Haupt was aided in Chicago
by his parents, by his uncle and aunt, Mr. and Mrs. Walter
Froehling, and by Otto Wergin, a Chicago Bund member. He
also visited his former girl friend and a bartender, both of
whom later turned him in. In the meantime he was enjoying
movies, fun, and romance. At one point, Haupt astounded the
agent following him by brazenly wandering into the Chicago
F.B.I. office to inquire if he was in any difficulty over his selective
service status. The agent on duty, who had been hastily warned
by radio, assured Haupt that he was not wanted, which was
true enough at that moment. Haupt was arrested later at a road-
side inn. All of those who had incriminated themselves by aiding
Haupt were also apprehended. They were subsequently tried,
convicted, and sentenced to prison terms, and after the war they
were deported to Germany. 14 Herman Neubauer had followed
Haupt to Chicago, and he was arrested on June 27 at the
Sheridan Plaza Hotel. 
Meanwhile, in New York, the F.B.I. was watching Kerling’s
close friends, his wife, and his mistress. They picked up his
trail as he visited a friend, and then followed him to Central
Park, where, as agents watched at a discreet distance, he em-
braced his mistress in what he believed was the privacy of a
13. For the story of the Long Island landing group, and the apprehension
and trial of all the invaders, see W. A. Swanberg, “The Spies who Came
in from the Sea,” American Heritage (April 1970), 66-69, 87-91.
14. Dasch, Eight Spies Against America, 115.
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cluster of bushes. Shortly afterwards federal agents arrested
him in a nearby bar.
On June 24 Kerling was taken from New York to Jackson-
ville. The following day, in handcuffs and leg irons, he was
taken to the landing point south of Ponte Vedra where he
glumly pointed out the burial place of the explosive boxes. He
refused for some curious reason to disclose the location of the
German marine caps and the shovels, claiming that they had
been thrown into the ocean somewhere between Ponte Vedra
and Jacksonville Beach.
Under the direction and supervision of Donald L. Parsons,
a munitions expert, the explosives were dug out of the sand. The
crater was then filled in and carefully covered over and the boxes
were transported to Jacksonville, and fro mthere to the F.B.I.
laboratory in Washington for examination. The waterproof
wooden explosives boxes were each about the size of a medium-
sized citrus crate. They contained a varied assortment and num-
ber of explosives and detonating devices. There were several
hundred small blocks of TNT about the size of an old-fashioned
bar of laundry soap. There were also a small number of pieces
of TNT cut and blackened like lumps of soft coal. Other items
included large coils of fuse, electric blasting caps, electric
matches, and safety fuse lighters that would set off a charge of
explosives without any telltale flare that could lead to prema-
ture discovery. There was a sulphuric acid incendiary device
that could be carried like a pen. It could be laid anywhere and
set off easily be breaking a small glass capsule that would release
the acid and promptly start a fire. Another item in this Florida
cache was a Swiss watch mechanism that could be set from one
to ten days to touch off a detonator or incendiary device.
The F.B.I. activities at Ponte Vedra and in Jacksonville
were carried on with great secrecy. Some of the saboteurs were
still at large and under surveillance at the time in Chicago.
Premature publicity would have caused them to flee, and it
could have disrupted observation of their Chicago contacts and
development of necessary evidence for prosecution for treason.
The F.B.I. also had reason to believe that these saboteurs would
make other contacts and time was needed to identify and pin
down these suspects. The leaders of both the Florida and Long
Island groups carried handkerchiefs upon which were written, in
8
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invisible ink, names and addresses of trusted contacts in the
United States. There was also some suspicion that three other
saboteurs might be arriving from Germany by submarine, and
premature disclosure of the arrest of the early parties and a
Florida investigation might scare them off or make their ap-
prehension more difficult.
It was difficult during the earliest stages of the investigation
to maintain secrecy. This was particularly true when the party
returned to Jacksonville Beach and Ponte Vedra with Kerling.
Military personnel regularly patrolled the beach, using airplanes,
jeeps, and horses. Although the F.B.I. party on the beach, in-
cluding Kerling, numbered about twelve men and three auto
mobiles, which were parked on AIA, fortunately the group was
not discovered by the patrolling forces, although they passed
close by on several occasions.
Kerling was returned to New York City from Jacksonville
on the evening of June 25. Several days later on July 1, the
writer, in Miami, received a telephone call from the F.B.I.
office in New York, advising that Kerling had finally confessed
that the marine caps and shovels were, in fact, buried in the
sand a short distance from the point where the explosives had
been found. Instructions were to proceed to Jacksonville im-
mediately, and, then to the beach with another agent to locate
this additional evidence. Early on the morning of July 2, the
search began. Using a long-pointed iron bar, the two men
involved spent several frantic hours probing the sand while
at the same time trying to avoid the beach patrols from noticing
them. At last a buried shovel was discovered. Another shovel
and four caps were eventually recovered. Photographs of the
entire area, the crater in which the shovels and caps were buried,
and the articles themselves were taken. All of the items were
marked for identification so that they could be used as evidence
in the forthcoming trials in Washington, New York, and Chicago.
J. Edgar Hoover had kept Attorney General Francis Biddle
posted on all details of the case, and the latter reported to
President Roosevelt who was following all of the developments
with interest. The defendants were charged with violation of
the eighty-first and eighty-second Articles of War and the Law
of War, and specifically the sections relating to espionage, sabo-
tage, and conspiracy. A directive from the President on July 2,
9
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1942, ordered their trial by a military commission of seven
generals. 15 He had told the attorney general that he would not
authorize trial by a civil court. Two-thirds of the court would
be necessary for conviction and sentence, and the President as
commander-in-chief would make the final decision. There would
be no appeal.
The trial of the eight saboteurs began on July 8, 1942,
in a large room on the fifth floor of the justice department
building in Washington. The windows were covered with
black curtains and reporters were excluded. The reporters were
offended by the heavy cloak of secrecy. The defendants were
held in the District of Columbia jail, and they were transported
daily by armored van, guarded by Tommy guns, from their cells
to the court. The routes were changed with each trip.
The trial took three weeks. The case against the eight was
presented carefully, and there was little doubt of the outcome.
Of all of them, only Kerling did not try to implicate anyone
else; he remained a Nazi to the end. Haupt swore that he had
gone along with the plan out of fear, and Thiel said he thought
Quentz Farm was only a training center for propagandists. He
had joined in the plot, he implied, in order to get back into
America. Neubauer insisted that it was his soldier’s duty to
carry out his orders. “As a soldier you are not supposed to
think,” he said, “and I did not.”
On August 3 the generals gave their verdict-death for all
eight defendants-to the President. On Saturday, August 8,
the White House issued the following statement to the press:
The President has completed his review of the findings and
sentences of the military commission. The President has ap-
proved the judgment of the commission that all of the
prisoners were guilty and that they be given the death sen-
tence by electrocution.
However, there was a unanimous recommendation by the
Commission, concurred in by the Attorney General and the
Judge Advocate General of the Army, that the sentence of
two of the prisoners be commuted to life imprisonment be-
cause of their assistance to the Government of the United
States in the apprehension and conviction of the others.” 16
15. The author testified against the saboteurs in their treason trials. He also
served as guard for Ernest Peter Burger.
16. Wighton and Peis, Hitler’s Spies and Saboteurs, 79.
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Georg Johann Dasch received thirty years and was sent to the
federal prison at Danbury, Connecticut; Burger was sentenced
to life. The four saboteurs who had landed at Ponte Vedra
Beach were electrocuted by the United States Army on the
afternoon of August 8, 1942, at Washington. Haupt was the
first to die at a little past noon. After an autopsy at Walter
Reed Hospital the bodies were buried in the District of Co-
lumbia Potter’s Field at Blue Plains. Operation Pastorius which
the Nazis had hoped would make history, had become instead
merely a fascinating historical footnote.
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